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HAIL TO THE CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND
THE SUPREME COURT
Dennis J. Hutchinson*

EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE. By G. Edward White. New York:
Oxford University Press. 1982. Pp. x, 429. $25.
SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT - A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY. BY Bernard Schwartz. Unabridged edition.
New York: New York University Press. 1983. Pp. xii, 833. $29.95.
If a man shall be judged by his foes as well as by his friends, then Earl
Warren led a charmed life as Chief Justice of the United States. For the
sixteen years that he occupied the office, Warren benefited from extravagant praise by public figures and friendly scholars, and from condemnation
by racial bigots, Birchers, and religious zealots. When Warren retired from
the Supreme Court in 1969 and again when he died five years later, it was
said that an era had passed with him: a moral epoch, which somehow he
personified, had ended. 1 In the nine years since Warren's death, his enemies and critics have found new targets, but his place in history is now
jeopardized by some of his best friends - or at least those sympathetic to
the era and the man who symbolized it. G. Edward White and Bernard
Schwartz, both of whom must be counted among Warren's friendly critics,2
have produced book-length studies that focus on the Chief Justice and the
Court over which he presided. Both books claim to be biographies in the
traditional sense, but neither is: White has written an extended essay attacking what he sees as the conventional historical stereotype of Warren,3
and Schwartz has produced a term-by-term narrative, with occasional
asides, about the Court's deliberations and major constitutional decisions
between 1953 and 1969. White's book, for all its scrupulous attention to the
facts and its elegant presentation, reads more like a brief than a biography,
and a curiously dated brief at that. The issues for White are the issues
shaped by Warren's severest academic critics in the 1960s. In order to rescue Warren post mortem, White resorts to rather slippery definitions of
• Associate Professor in the College and Associate Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago. A.B. 1969, Bowdoin College; LL.M. 1974, The University of Texas at Austin; M.A.
1977, Oxford University. - Ed.
I. For the most recent expression of this sentiment, see Parrish, Earl Warren and the Amer/•
can Judicial Tradition, 1982 A.B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1179.
2. White was law clerk to Warren during the third year of Warren's retirement, 1971-1972.
For an earlier appraisal by White of the Warren Court, see G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDI·
CIAL TRADITION ch. 14 (1976). For an example of Schwartz's early estimate of Warren, see
Schwartz, "Warren Court"-An Opinion, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1957, (Magazine),reprintedin
THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 48 (L. Levy ed. 1972).

3. Cf. p. 5.
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terms such as conservative, progressive, and jurisprudence. Along the way,
the reader loses sight of Warren, who is caught in a web of taxonomy.
Schwartz's book is less pretentious but more revealing. The Warren
who emerges from Schwartz's year-by-year chronicle did not dominate the
Court, spiritually or intellectually; he merely presided over it. The selection
of cases and the assignment of opinions were skillful, but the ideas of the
Court that set fires in the minds of men and women during the period came
not from Warren but first from Hugo Black and then quickly, and for the
balance of Warren's tenure, from William J. Brennan. Schwartz's argument belies his subtitle: it was "the Brennan Court."4

I
Professor White lists three "assumptions" about Warren's public life
which he seeks to challenge in his book:
The first is that Warren was a conservative California Politician; I shall
suggest that neither the term "conservative" nor the term "politician" accurately describes Warren's career as a California public official. The second
is that Warren underwent a marked change in his attitudes once on the
Supreme Court. I shall argue that his public life can be seen as of a piece
and that the surface contradictions in his thought can be seen as manifestations of a deep commitment to a general set of principles that were consistent in themselves. The third is that Warren was not a legal technician and
that his jurisprudential views were largely derivative. I shall contend that
Warren was merely a different kind oflegal technician, unorthodox rather
than inept, and that his theory of judging, while uniquely his, was not without its own theoretical integrity. [P. 4.]
The agenda is puzzling. The first two assumptions have little to do with
Warren's legacy, reputation or importance as Chief Justice of the United
States. The elected public official and the Chief Justice presumably have
different roles and responsibilities, so the relevance of the relationship between the two is not immediately clear. In any event, White devotes his
most sustained and felt attention to the third assumption, which he seems to
think stands in the way of Warren's ultimate certification to judicial
greatness.
White states that Warren relied for his view of the Constititution not on
history, text, or precedent, but on an acute ethical sensibility to the human
consequences of the case at hand:
Warren's craftsmanship as a jurist was thus of a different order from that
identified with enlightened judging by proponents of judicial restraint.
Warren saw his craft as discovering ethical imperatives in a maze of confusion, pursuing those imperatives vigorously and self-confidently, urging
others to do likewise, and making technical concessions, if necessary, to
secure support. In believing his concessions on matters of doctrine to be
"technical," Warren was defining his own role as a craftsman. It was a role
in which one's sense of where justice lay and one's confidence in the certainty of finding it were elevated to positions of prominence in constitutional adjudication, and where craftsmanship consisted- of knowing what
4. Cf. Rodell,It is the Earl Warren Court, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1966 (Magazine),reprinted
in THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, supra note 2, at 137.

924

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:922

results best harmonized with the ethical imperative of the Constitution and
how best to encourage other justices to reach those results. [Pp. 229-30.]
The craftsmanship of "ethicism," as construed by White, thus has two components: (1) an intuitive certitude of what the Constitution should stand for
in any given case, and (2) a rhetorical capacity to persuade others, at least a
majority of the Court, to see things the way he did. White realizes that this
version of craftsmanship verges, to say the least, on the solipsistic. He
quotes with approval Anthony Lewis' well-known description of Warren as
"the closest thing the United States has had to a Platonic Guardian," 5 and
asks: "Is Lewis right in suggesting that the posture of an ethicist is fatally
dependent on the ethicist's own character?" (p. 359).
Even if one is ethically cock-sure of the bottom line, the future significance of a judicial decision depends largely on how the bottom line is rationalized. White seems to concede that the second component of Warren's
craft was often inadequate to the task, and identifies Brennan as "Warren's
judicial technician. He was capable, in cases such as Baker v. Carr, or New
York Times v. Sullivan, of supplying doctrinal rationales for decisions in
which Warren strongly believed" (p. 185).
Brennan's importance, which emerges more vividly in Schwartz's book,
goes well beyond what White describes. Not only did Brennan provide the
theoretical framework for Warren's ethical intuitions, but he did so in a
way that held together majority opinions that might otherwise have splintered into several precedentially-insignificant voices. In a larger sense,
Brennan provided a doctrinal coherence - admittedly not accepted by all
- for what the Court was doing. To the extent that the Court over which
Warren presided has any intellectual legacy that is accessible to those
trained in doctrine and not in ethics, it is Brennan who is responsible.
What did Warren provide other than a handy vote and a symbolic
figurehead for the legal and social revolution that the Court touched off?
Perhaps Warren's stature was assured in the minds of many with the decision during his first term in Brown v. Board of Education. 6 His achievement, widely praised at the time, was not only in authoring the opinion that
found state-imposed segregation in public schools unconstitutional, but also
- almost more important - in pulling together a unanimous Court for the
result and the opinion.7 For White, Brown is the "crucible" for Earl Warren that shaped his role and his vision of his job (ch. 6), and he recounts the
now familiar story of how unanimity was achieved. 8
Brown may have been Warren's crucible (White's evidence is very circumstantial), but it is too much to say that Warren deserves the lion's share
of responsibility for the unanimity that the justices displayed on May 17,
5. P. 359, quoting Lewis, Earl Warren, in IV L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2721,
2726 (1969).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. See generally Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme
Court, 1948-1958, 68 Geo. L.J. I (1979).
8. See Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. POL. 690 (1971), reprinted in L.
FRIEDMAN & H. SCHEIBER, AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES 343 (1978); Hutchinson, supra note 7, at 34-44. See generally, R. KLUG ER, SIM·
PLE JUSTICE (1976).
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1954. I have argued elsewhere in detail that, far from shaping a unanimous
Court for Brown, Warren inherited a Court that had been largely prepared,
since 1950, to rule unanimously that segregation in public schools was unconstitutional.9 In that year, the Court held that state-imposed segregation
at the college level violated the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The internal evidence of the Court's deliberations in those
cases, Sweatt v. Painter 10 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 11
makes abundantly clear that the justices knew what was coming, knew that
it would be impossible to rule the other way, and felt that unanimity was an
extremely valuable tool for securing compliance with the decision. Warren's achievement in Brown was to head off a possible dissent by Stanley
Reed and a threatened co~curring opinion by Robert H. Jackson. The
achievement is significant, but it is not on the order of achieving the result
singlehandedly.
Warren's achievement in Brown was purchased at a high price. The
sticking point in the Court's deliberations prior to Warren's arrival was not
so much result as remedy. Chief Justice Vinson, and Justices Reed, Jackson
and Clark had all expressed anxieties more over implementation than over
the substantive decision. When Warren became Chief Justice after what
too many have viewed as Vinson's timely death, he immediately realized
the problem and solved it in melodramatic fashion: he persuaded the justices to decide the substantive issue first and to delay decision on the decree
until later. The tactic worked perfectly, but the divisions over the remedy
were postponed rather than defused. When the case was reargued a year
later, it became clear that the remedy was, if anything, an even more bewildering question than it had appeared to be under Vinson. Having been
unanimous once, the justices felt that they had to be unanimous again or
risk undermining the moral force of their first decision. Warren again
wrote for a unanimous Court, but this time unanimity was limited to the
lowest common denominator among the nine - which produced equivocation and temporization on every line. To a large extent, then, the unanimity
Warren helped to consolidate in Brown I boomeranged in Brown IL 12
Warren's tactics for marshalling the Court in the School Segregation
Cases deserve only qualified praise even from those who view judicial performance, especially by a Chief Justice, as essentially a function of internal
administration. Moreover, Warren's behavior with respect to the opinions
in the segregation cases demonstrate the nature and price of craftsmanship
based on ethics. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 13 the companion case to Brown from
the District of Columbia, the first draft of Warren's opinion for the Court
held that federally-imposed segregation in the District's schools violated the
fifth amendment, because "[i]t would be unthinkable that the Federal Government should have a lesser duty to protect what, in our present circum9. Hutchinson, supra note 7.
10. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
11. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
12. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
13. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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stances, is a fundamental liberty." 14 Warren changed the sentence, and
thus the entire constitutional basis for the opinion, when Justices Black and
Frankfurter objected to reliance on the substantive due process jurisprudence of the McReynolds era. According to White: "The precise doctrinal
steps that the Court took to justify the eradication through constitutional
analysis were far less important to Warren than the Court's reaching the
result of eradication unequivocally and unanimously" (p. 228).
Whatever one thinks of the appropriateness of the constitutional analysis assumed by White's observation, neither Warren then, nor White now,
seem to appreciate fully the costs of Warren's casual attitude toward the
theoretical content of opinions issued by the Court. "Deeds without doctrines," as Robert G. McCloskey one~ called them, 15 are self-defeating. In
the short run, they leave the Court vulnerable to attack for being willful
rather than rational; in the long run, they provide an empty legacy to inheritors of the faith. Professor Ronald Dworkin, by no means unsympathetic
to the mission of the Warren Court, criticized Justice Douglas for the same
failure. 16
If Douglas's constitutional theories were wishful or transparently fanciful, Warren's were simply empty. "Evolving standards of decency" 17 may
be a convenient rationalization, but it hardly provides much guidance for
future cases. And to say that a contrary result would be "unthinkable" only
invites doubt - at least as a general principle. 18 At times, Warren even
gave away more doctrinally than he might have wished had he looked
down the road: his contribution to the jurisprudence of the Equal Protection Clause in McGowan v. Mary/and 19 has been an annoying obstacle in
the past decade to those who have tried to carry on the egalitarian revolution that began during his tenure.20 If one looks to Warren for an enduring
legacy, as White seems to invite us to do, one finds more symbol than
substance.
II

Unlike White, Schwartz does not get bogged down in theory or in elaborate arguments to rehabilitate Warren's reputation for the ages. Facts, not
concepts, are Professor Schwartz's meat. He has combed most21 of the
14. The draft is published in its entirety in Hutchinson, supra note 7, at 93. White's discussion is at pp. 226-28.
15. McCloskey, Deeds without Doctrines, 56 AM. PoL. Sc1. REV. 71 (1962), reprinted i11 R.
MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 221 (1972).
16. Dworkin, Book Review, NEW YORK REV. OF BOOKS, at Feb. 19, 1981, at 3, 7.
17. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, IOI (1958).
18. See generally Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Rea/isl Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 232-34
(1972).
19. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See also McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802
(1969).
20. For Justice Brennan's attempts to put some teeth into the McGowan test, see, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166, 182 (1980) (dissenting opinion); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 511 (1975) (dissenting opinion); United States Dept. of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
21. It does not appear that Schwartz consulted the working papers of Justice Robert H.
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available judicial papers for the period (those of Hugo Black, Harold Burton, Tom Clark, William 0. Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, and John Marshall
Harlan), interviewed former clerks to Warren, and talked on and off the
record with all the living justices who sat with Warren except Thurgood
Marshall. The materials for a rich and sustained portrait are all on the
table: The result is less a biography of Warren than an annotated set of
internal minutes for October Terms 1953 through 1968.
The Chief Justice who emerges from this welter of detail is, however,
vivid and possessed of a great presence, unlike the bloodless abstraction
pictured by Professor White. Thus, of the 1956 Term, Schwartz writes:
In most respects Earl Warren could have been a character out of Sinclair Lewis or Sherwood Anderson. Justice Potter Stewart's comments are
worth requoting: "Warren's great strength was his simple belief in the
things we now laugh at: motherhood, marriage, family, flag, and the like."
These, according to Stewart, were the "eternal, rather bromidic, platitudes
in which he sincerely believed." These were the foundation of Warren's
jurisprudence, as they were of his way of life.
·
When we add to this Warren's bluff masculine bonhomie, his love of
sports and the outdoors, and his lack of intellectual interests or pretensions,
we end up with a typical representative of the middle America of his day.
Except for one thing - Warren's leadership abilities. As Stewart sees it,
Warren may not have been an intellectual, but "he had instinctive qualities
of leadership." [P. 204.]
Warren, as Schwartz shows, also had a temper that could flare when provoked (p. 336) and a consuming vanity. Schwartz shows Warren reacting
furiously because he had not been informed that morning coats would be
worn at a London reception (p. 284); ticking off the American Bar Association for "deliberately and trickily contriv[ing] to discredit the Supreme
Court which I headed" (p. 285); and tongue-lashing a journalist who had
committed the double sin of painting a favorable picture of Richard M.
Nixon and an unflattering one of Warren: "You people are persecuting me
because you know I can't strike back" (p. 337).
If Warren hated anything more than "persecution" by those who saw
the world differently than he did, it was Nix.on. Professor Schwartz shows
that Warren became infuriated at Nix.on during the 1952 Republican Convention, when Nixon publically and privately promised to support Warren
for President but "betrayed" him by supporting Eisenhower, thus earning
Warren's enduring contempt- a contempt that Schwartz says was an "almost visceral repugnance" (p. 21). Forget the bland and self-effacing Warren of his Memoirs, 22 the man who had no unkind words for anyone.
Warren hated "Tricky Dick - that's what we used to call him," "a crook
and a thief' (p. 21). According to Schwartz, Warren announced his retirement in 1968 in order to prevent the appointment to the Chief Justiceship
from going to Nix.on, who he feared would be elected President in the fall.
Jackson. Jackson served only part of one term with Warren, however, and his papers may
shed little light on the Chief Justice.
22. E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN (1977). For a perceptive
essay on Warren and his memoirs, see Powe,Earl Warren: A Partial JJissenl, 56 N.C. L. Rev.
408 (1978).
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When the maneuver failed, Warren regretted that he had not simply decided to stay in office.23 The book closes with Warren exulting at the news,
delivered by Justice Brennan, that the Court had stonewalled Nixon in the
tapes case.24 A few minutes later, Warren died.
Warren's place in history depends not on his personality or his choice of
enemies, but on his performance as Chief Justice of the United States.
Schwartz views leadership as Warren's most important contribution to the
Court, and he constantly refers to Warren's leadership and his leadership
qualities, although the content of the terms rests largely on inference. Warren frequently was a necessary fourth vote to bring a controversial case
before the Court (as in Baker v. Carr, 25 where he joined Black, Douglas,
and Brennan) (p. 411). He kept his clerks watching for the "right" case to
overrule Betts v. Brady 26 (p. 458). He assigned opinions fairly and
shrewdly, which kept the troops happy (pp. 460-61 ). And he assigned to
himself opinions that he suspected would generate extensive and unpleasant criticism - such as Brown, Miranda v. Arizona ,21 and Reynolds v.
Sims 28 to spare his associates (and to make his place in history?).
If Warren was a great leader, it was due in part to good luck: He enjoyed, from the beginning of October Term 1962 when Arthur Goldberg
took his seat, the ideological companionship of four other justices who
could be relied on for the most part, at least until the end, to see the Constitution and the Court's mission the way he did (Black, Douglas, Brennan,
and first Goldberg, then Fortas). Or as Schwartz puts it: "Even the most
inspiring general must, however, have the troops who are willing and able
to follow his lead. Chief Justice Warren received his most capable lieutenant after Sherman Minton resigned in 1956" (p. 204).
Minton was replaced by William J. Brennan, who was more than Warren's "most capable lieutenant." He was Warren's intellectual chief-of-staff
from the first term in which he sat. Brennan was the man whom Warren
called on to produce an opinion where the tentative majority was united as
to result but sharply divided over reasoning. Brennan also did the anonymous dirty work of crafting per curiam opinions that were in fact committee reports in highly controversial cases (Cooper v. Aaron 29 and Alabama v.
23. "If I had ever known what was going to happen to this country and this Court, I 11e1•er
would have resigned. They would have had to carry me out of here on a plank-," P. 771.
24. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
25. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
26. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). "Even before the 1961 Term began, the Chiefs new law clerks
were instructed by one of the prior term's clerks. 'Keep your eyes peeled for a right to counsel
case. The Chief feels strongly that the Constitution requires a lawyer.' " P. 458. Bells was
overruled March 18, 1963, in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
27. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
28. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
To one interested in Warren, the Gideon case (written by Justice Black) is a good illustration of his fairness in assigning opinions. He did not take the "big" cases for himself,
except where, as in the Brown segregation case, he thought it was important that the Court
speak through the Chief Justice, or, as in Reynolds v. Sims or Miranda v. Arizona, he
wanted to bear the brunt of the expected criticism.
P. 460. That may be true, but Schwartz also demonstrates amply throughout the book that
Warren was not averse to the limelight.
29. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). For other accounts of Brennan's work in the Little Rock school case,
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United States 30 (pp. 463-64) are the most prominent examples), and it was
Brennan who occasionally supplied the theory in a concurring opinion that
filled in the gaps left by a bold but incohesive opinion for the Court (his
opinions in the controversial religion cases, Engel v. Vitale 31 and Abington
School .District v. Schempp, 32 stand out as the de facto opinions for the
Court).33 In addition to writing Cooper v. Aaron, for which he received no
public credit, Brennan frequently served as Warren's editor before an important opinion was circulated (as in Miranda v. Arizona (pp. 590-91)) and
occasionally he even helped the most independent author on the Court, Justice Douglas. The most startling fact about the genesis of opinions that
Schwartz catalogues is that Brennan, not Douglas, designed the spectral
theory of Griswold, which Douglas, in a first draft, had tried to dispose of
on the basis of freedom of association under the first amendment (pp. 57780). Warren thought that the case might be handled on the basis of Yick
Wo v. Hopkins 34 (p. 577). In case after case, Schwartz documents in numbing detail how Brennan would accommodate his own drafts and views in
order to preserve an opinion of the Court that was tumbling toward a plurality or worse. 35 Warren may have given the orders, but it was Brennan
who put together the General's victories.
When the public record is added to Schwartz's numerous behind-thescenes examples of managing the Court, Brennan emerges clearly as the
single most important justice of the period. The list of his opinions for the
Court on constitutional questions reads like a syllabus for any comprehensive study of what is usually referred to as the "Warren Court."36 Under
see Hutchinson, supra note 7, at 73; Heck, The Socialization
Years of Justice Brennan lO PAC. LJ. 707, 723-24 (1979).

of a Freshman Justice:

The Early

30. 373 U.S. 545 (1963).
31. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
32. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
33. See McCloskey, Principles, Powers, and Values, in R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 15, at
290-321. See generally Heck, Justice Brennan and the Heyday of Warren Court Liberalism, 20
SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 841 (1980).
34. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
35. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (pp. 413-14); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963) (pp. 456-57); Heart of Atlanta Motor Hotel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964) (pp. 554-55); Katzenbach v. Mcclung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (pp. 554-55); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (pp. 601-02); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (pp. 64041); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Betts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967} {pp. 651-52); Te':1)' v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l
(1968) (pp. 691-92); Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968)
(pp. 705-06); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (pp. 725-32).
36. See, e.g., Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (defendant's right to exculpatory
materials before trial); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (constitutional standard for
obscenity); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (justiciability of apportionment); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (first amendment protection of civil rights lawyers' solicitation of
business); Fay v. Noia, 371 U.S. 391 (1963) (habeas corpus); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (free exercise of religion); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (constitutional standard for libel); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (application of fifth amendment
to states, overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965) (federal court intervention into state court proceedings to vindicate constitutional rights); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Congressional power under section
five of the fourteenth amendment); Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391
U.S. 430 (1968) (expansion of remedy under Brown v. Board ofEduc.); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (unconstitutionality of durational residency requirements for welfare).
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Warren E. Burger and on a different Court, Brennan's impact has been
reduced dramatically. Nonetheless, he is still capable of stitching together
majorities, on occasion, that are reminiscent of the old days. 37
III

Taken together, White and Schwartz have collaborated unwittingly to
put Warren in his place. Although Warren was an important and
courageous figure and although he inspired passionate devotion among his
followers, as the warm tributes in the Harvard Law Review 38 movingly attest, he was a dull man and a dull judge. His significance has been magnified out of proportion by the enemies he made and by the short-hand by
which the constitutional revolution over which he presided became known.
Despite the habit of mind that continues to call it the "Warren Court" and
the occasional vague encomia that some of his colleagues supplied to confirm the myth, 39 if any single justice deserves to be identified with the constitutional revolution engineered by the Supreme Court in the last
generation, it is William J. Brennan and not Earl Warren.
There are now five biographies of Earl Warren, counting the recent contributions of White and Schwartz.40 None does justice to its subject, although Professor Schwartz does Warren the great courtesy of treating him
on a human scale and not as larger than life. A critical analysis of the
Brennan period is needed now, but five biographies of Earl Warren are
enough.

Brennan's opinions through 1966 are collected in s. FRIEDMAN, AN AFFAIR WITH FREEDOM
(1967).
37. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (1982); Weber v. Steelworkers, 443 U.S. 193
(1979) (Title VII and "affirmative action"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (equal protec•
tion for women); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (further
expansion of remedy under Brown v. Board ofEduc.); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(personal autonomy); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (procedural due process),
38. See Brennan, ChiefJustice Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1974); Black,An Impression of
the Late ChiefJustice, id at 6; Pollak, The Legacy ofEarl Warren, id. at 8; Ely, The C/1ief, id.
at 11. See also Proceedings in the Supreme Court in Memory ofMr. ChiefJustice Warren, 421
U.S. v. (1975).
39. Schwartz takes his title and epigraph from Brennan: "To those who served with him,
Earl Warren will always be the Super Chief' (p. vii). See also A. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE
(1971); Fortas, ChiefJustice Warren: The Enigma ofLeadership, 84 YALE L.J, 405 (1975), But
even Fortas found Warren's importance unquantifiable, indeed almost "occult." Id. at 406.
See also Powe, supra note 22, at 421 (Warren's "greatness" is "elusive").
40. See also L. KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (1967); J, WEAVER,
WARREN: THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA (1967); J, POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE
WHO CHANGED AMERICA (1979).

